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Abstract-The dynamic and cooperative nature of ad hoc 
networkspresent challenges in securing these networks. There 
arerecent research efforts in securing ad hoc networks. 
Amongstsecurity approaches, there are threshold 
cryptography andauthentication. In this paper we survey the 
thresholdcryptography based schemes and the authentication 
schemesthat have been proposed to secure ad hoc networks. 
Weconclude this paper and identify the challenges and 
openresearch areas associated with each of these 
approaches.The idea of threshold cryptography is to protect 
information(or computation) by fault-tolerantly distributing it 
among acluster of cooperating computers. First consider 
thefundamental problem of threshold cryptography, a 
problemof secure sharing of a secret. A secret sharing scheme 
allowsone to distribute a piece of secret information among 
severalservers in a way that meets the following requirements: 
(1)no group of corrupt servers (smaller than a given 
threshold)can figure out what the secret is, even if they 
cooperate; (2)when it becomes necessary that the secret 
information bereconstructed, a large enough number of servers 
(a numberlarger than the above threshold) can always do it. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
hresholdCryptographyis the art of chopping asecret into 
little bits. Only by possessing morethan a threshold 
number of bits of the secret canthe secret be determined. 
Algorithms exist tobreak any secret up such that at least and 
exactlyM out of N holders of pieces of the secret mustgive 
approval (and their partial secret or key) inorder to compute 
the total secret (e.g. 3 of 5, 3 of12, 5 of 12, etc.). Removing 
probability has acost, though... a secret must be broken into 
C(N,M-1) pieces and each holder carries (NM+1)/N parts of 
the whole key... so '3 of 12' ismore expensive per-node than 
'5 of 12'. (Thesenumbers come from the pigeonhole 
principle andconstraints: any piece 'pK' must be found on 
NM+1 holders so that access to a full M 
secretholdersguarantees 'pK' will be known, whilstaccess to 
M-1 computers must guarantee thatthere is at least one piece 
not found, so 'pK' mustNOT be with the other M-1 
computers Theminimum number of component 'pK' 
elements todo this is (N) Choose (M-1). Individual 
pKelements can be made artificially large in orderto subvert 
guessing of one or two missing pieces;the combinatory 
function needn't be 
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straightforward appended. However, Thecomputation and 
storage cost of this approach ishigh, and it may do well to 
combine it with somestraightforward split-and-distribute as 
listedabove; e.g. splitting the 'require 5 of 7 pieces' to'more 
than 7' people is the natural extension tosplitting 'require 3 
of 3 pieces' to '12 people'. Thecombined effect can avoid  
the massive costs ofsplitting and storing, say '5 of 20' parts 
(C(20,4)unique parts, every node holding ~16/20ths oftotal 
secret, vs. C(7,4) parts with each nodeholding 3/7ths of total 
secret). The mainadvantage of mixing in this algorithmic 
divisionapproach is in achieving better guarantees as 
toredundancy and survivability whilesimultaneously 
increasing the number of usersone must access to possess 
the whole secret. E.g.for the other approach, to require 5 
users wouldrequire splitting the key into 5 pieces 
anddivvying that up among, say, 15 people; it wouldtake 
access to 5 people to gain the secret, and thesecret could be 
lost by losing 3 people. Splittingit to 5 of 7 first, then 
dividing the 7 chunksamong 14 people results in 2 different 
peoplehaving a copy of any given chunk, and the 
secretwon't be lost before losing 6 people (losing threewhole 
chunks). 
As a security measure, Threshold Cryptography requires 
that many systems must be compromised prior to taking 
control of a secret,inherently including resistance to 
snooping orabuse by any super users of the 
computationresource (who would have the ability to do so 
ifthe secret were wholly on one system). It alsoprovides 
inherent redundancy of the secret... e.g.if you can guarantee 
that it takes at least and atmost 5 of 12 secret-holders to 
build the secret,you can guarantee that a failure of up to 
7systems is tolerable without failure. With aprobabilistic 
split, you can easily calculate apercentage chance that the 
data is unavailable foreach loss of node... and, with 
intelligent split ofcomponents, you can guarantee that at 
least somecount of nodes must be lost before the data 
hasany chance of being lost.In the case of authorization to 
access a differentsystem (e.g. to control a power plant), 
securitycan be increased further by demanding that a 
fewparts of the approval come from –particularpeoplethat 
are known to still be accessible... andby changing these 
people at regular intervals.This makes it much more difficult 
to gain accesseven by compromising the systems... 
becauseyou can't easily know which particular systemsought 
to be compromised. 
II. MOTIVATION 
 
The strongest reason for using this mechanismover 
straightforward encryption is that a secretmight need to be 
available to users that can onlyprovide a -certificate- 
authorizing access to a fileor service, and the primary 
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encryption isn'tagainst any key with which individuals 
sharelong-term access (there is no shared key). E.g.one can 
use ThresholdCryptography to encryptfiles or split keys 
requiring, say, either 'Secret'clearance with 'Power Grid' 
specialization, or'Top Secret' clearance, represented as 
acertificate signed by a government master keynot in 
expiration, and any individual that canprove to M of N 
systems that he or she possessesthe necessary clearances 
will be provided thecapability to actually perform the task. 
Keydistribution is a difficult problem, doubly sowhen you 
won't trust that any one keydistribution server hasn't been 
compromised;ThresholdCryptography is one of the 
moreelegant answers to that particular problem. Avery 
useful extension of secret sharing isfunction sharing. Its 
main idea is that a highlysensitive operation, such as 
decryption orsigning, can be performed by a group 
ofcooperating servers in such a way that nominority of 
servers is able to perform thisoperation by themselves, nor 
would they be ableto prevent the other servers from 
performing theoperation when it is required. 
In many real-life situations, we don't believe that any given 
person can be trusted, and we may even suspect that a big 
fraction of all people are dishonest, yet it is reasonable to 
assume that the majority of people are trustworthy. 
Similarly, in on-line transactions, we may doubt that a given 
server can be trusted, but we hope that the majority of 
servers are working properly. Based on this assumption, we 
can create trusted entities. A good example of an application 
whose security could be greatly improved with a threshold 
solution is a network Certification Authority, a trusted entity 
that certifies that a given public key corresponds to a given 
user. If we trust one server to perform this operation,then it 
is possible that as a result of just one break-in, no certificate 
can any longer be trusted.Thus it is a good idea to distribute 
the functionality of the certification authority between many 
servers, so that an adversary would need to corrupt half of 
them before he can forge a certificate on some public key. 
Goals: In the threshold setting, we would like toimplement, 
via efficient protocols, the mostsecure cryptosystems and 
signature schemes. Wewould also like to make our protocols 
secure inthe strongest possible model of faults. 
Thefollowing are some of the various considerationswe 
make when modeling computer faults 
 
A. The Size Of The Threshold 
 
What fractionof the servers can be corrupted by 
theadversary without any harm to theservice (e.g. signature 
or decryption)that these servers implement? 
 
B. Efficiency Considerations 
 
How muchcommunication, storage, andcomputation dothese 
fault-tolerantprotocols require? 
 
C. Model Of Communication 
 
How realisticare the requirements we place on it? Dowe 
require synchronous or partiallysynchronous 
communication,authenticated broadcast and secure 
linksbetween servers? 
 
D. Type Of Adversary We Tolerate 
 
Howdoes the adversary choose whichplayers to corrupt? 
Can a serversecurely erase its local data so that itcannot be 
retrieved by the adversaryonce the server is infiltrated? 
 
III. PAILLIER CRYPTOSYSTEM ALGORITHM 
 
A. Key Generation 
i.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compute n = pq and 
ii. Select random integer g where  
iii. Ensure n divides the order of g bychecking the 
existence of the followingmodular multiplicative 
inverse 
Where function L is defined as 
Note that the notationdoes not denote  the 
modular multiplication ofa times the modular    
multiplicative inverse ofbbut rather the quotient of  
a divided by b,i.e., the largest integer value 
            to satisfy the relation 
 
a. The Public (Encryption) Key Is (N, G). 
b. The private (decryption) key is 
(λ, μ). 
If using p, q of equivalent length, a simpler variant of the 
above key generation steps would be to set 
And where 
 
IV. ENCRYPTION 
 
i. Let m be a message to be encryptedwhere 
ii. Select random r where 
iii. Compute cipher text as 
 
V. DECRYPTION 
 
i. Cipher text 
ii. Compute message 
  As the original paper points out, decryption is"essentially 
one exponentiation modulo n2." 
 
VI. HOMOMORPHIC PROPERTIES 
 
A notable feature ofthe Paillier cryptosystem isits 
homomorphic properties. As the encryptionfunction is  
additively homomorphic, thefollowing identities can be 
described: 
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A. Homomorphic Addition Of Plaintexts 
 
The product of two cipher texts will decrypt to the sum of 
their corresponding plaintexts, 
 
The product of a cipher text with A plaintext raising g will 
decrypt to the sum of the corresponding plaintexts, 
 
 
B. Homomorphic Multiplication OfPlaintexts 
 
An encrypted plaintext raised to the power of another 
plaintext will decrypt to the product of the two plaintexts, 
 
 
More generally, an encrypted plaintext raised to a constant k 
will decrypt to the product of the plaintext and the constant, 
 
However, given the Paillier encryptions of two messages 
there is no known way to compute an encryption of the 
product of these messages without knowing the private key. 
 
VII. SEMANTIC SECURITY 
 
The original cryptosystem as shown above doesprovide 
semantic security against chosenplaintextattacks (IND-
CPA). The ability tosuccessfully distinguish the challenge 
cipher textessentially amounts to the ability to 
decidecomposite residuosity. The so-called 
decisionalcomposite residuosity assumption (DCRA) 
isbelieved to be intractable.Because of the aforementioned 
homomorphicproperties however, the system is malleable, 
andtherefore does not enjoy the highest echelon ofsemantic 
security that protects against adaptivechosen-cipher text 
attacks (IND-CCA2). Usuallyin cryptography the notion of 
malleability is notseen as an "advantage," but under 
certainapplications such as secure electronic voting 
andthreshold cryptosystems, this property mayindeed be 
necessary.Paillier and Point cheval however went on 
topropose an improved cryptosystem thatincorporates the 
combined hashing of message mwith random r. Similar in 
intent to the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, the hashing 
prevents anattacker, given only c, from being able to 
changem in a meaningful way. Through this adaptationthe 
improved scheme can be shown to be INDCCA2secure in 
the random oracle model. 
VIII. APPLICATIONS 
 
A. Electronic voting 
 
Semantic security is not the only consideration.There are 
situations under which malleabilitymay be desirable. The 
above homomorphicproperties can be utilized by secure 
electronicvoting systems. Consider a simple binary ("for" 
or "against") vote. Let m voters cast a vote of either 1 (for) 
or 0 (against). Each voter encryptstheir choice before casting 
their vote. Theelection official takes the product of the 
mencrypted votes and then decrypts the result andobtains the 
valuen, which is the sum of all thevotes. The election 
official then knows that npeople voted for and m-n people 
voted against.The role of the random r ensures that 
twoequivalent votes will encrypt to the same valueonly with 
negligible likelihood, hence ensuringvoter privacy. 
 
B. ELECTRONIC CASH 
 
Another feature named in paper is the notion ofself-blinding. 
This is the ability to change onecipher text into another 
without changing thecontent of its decryption. This has 
application tothe development of electronic cash, an 
effortoriginally spear-headed by David Chaum.Imagine 
paying for an item online without thevendor needing to 
know your credit cardnumber, and hence your identity. The 
goal inboth electronic cash and electronic voting is toensure 
the e-coin (likewise e-vote) is valid, whileat the same time 
not disclosing the identity of theperson with whom it is 
currently associated. 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
A new threshold Signing scheme is proposed in this project 
that when combined with Shared Paillier secret keys 
generation will leads us to a complete solution for the 
Threshold Paillier problem. The complete solution has also 
been implemented successfully in this project. 
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